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“A thousand miles of silvered shore. An hundred thousand 
treasure isles—That sun-laved line broad sparkling aisles, 
Deep-steeped in wealth of Faery store;—Has Florida.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
In the bright blue waters off of Miami’s sun-bleached coast, trouble is 
brewing. In May 2013, Great Lakes Dredge & Dock (Great Lakes) 
announced its $122 million contract with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
(Army Corps). The Army Corps will pay Great Lakes, America’s largest 
dredging corporation, to deepen Miami Harbor’s entrance channel.2 The 
project is happening in an environmentally sensitive waterway, where 
seagrass and a coral reef supply lifelines to sea life, and the coastline is a 
recreation site for millions of people. Press releases report that the Army 
Corps will supervise Great Lakes, but it is well documented that most 
government contractors are largely self-monitored and left to their own 
devices by agencies that do not have the time or resources to oversee every 
project.3 As Great Lakes’ tugs and dredging boats gather off of Miami’s 
shores, Miami locals and ocean lovers everywhere may have reason to 
worry about this project. 
Unfortunately, based on Great Lakes’ prior projects, there is cause for 
concern. Previously, the Army Corps, in nearby Delray Beach, Florida, 
hired Great Lakes to dredge an inlet and sand-settling basin. A Great Lakes 
barge left a stretch of beach littered with rocks and coral rubble threatening 
the annual moonlight process of sea turtle nesting. According to reports, the 
barge dragged cables across coral and sponge formations in the Flower 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1. GEORGE E. MERRICK, Florida—The Treasure Land, in SONGS OF THE WIND ON A 
SOUTHERN SHORE, AND OTHER POEMS OF FLORIDA (2d ed. 1920). 
2. Press Release, Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Corp., Great Lakes Announces the Award 
of the Miami Deepening Project (May 16, 2013) available at 
http://investor.gldd.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=765563http://investor.gldd.com/releasedetail/cfm
?ReleaseID=765563. Information about the flora and fauna of Miami waterways is available at the 
Florida Department of Environmental Protection’s website, www.dep.state.fl.us. 
3. Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 155, 171–72 (2000); see 
also Nina A. Mendelson, Six Simple Steps to Increase Contractor Accountability, in GOVERNMENT BY 
CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 241, 241 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow 
eds., 2009) (describing that in addition to bearing responsibility over contracted border security plans, 
contractors also have oversight of the plan itself). 
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Garden Reef.4 In 2002, the Department of Justice ordered Great Lakes to 
pay almost $1 million for destroying the ecosystem of the Florida Bay with 
a dredging pipe and creating a hole in the ground the size of one and a half 
football fields.5 The accident affected the flora and fauna in the Florida 
Keys National Marine Sanctuary, including seagrass meadows and finger 
coral that are critical to fish and other marine life populations as well as 
necessary to stabilize sediments and create clear waters. 6  The same 
company paid the United States a $20,000 settlement in 2004 after its 
dredged waste spilled from barges into a marine sanctuary in California’s 
Richmond Harbor.7 
Although Great Lakes Dredge and Dock sounds like it could be a 
smaller business in the Great Lakes region of the country, the company is 
actually a gigantic corporation that conducts business worldwide. Great 
Lakes benefits from the Jones Act, which protects it from international 
competition.8 As a result of this protection, Great Lakes is the largest 
dredging company in the United States, and it receives continuous 
workflow from the federal government.9 Because Great Lakes does so 
much of America’s coastal development work, their spotty environmental 
record should be open to public scrutiny. But, like other government 
contractors, Great Lakes cannot be easily scrutinized. Where the Freedom 
of Information Act (FOIA) requires government agencies to be transparent, 
government contractors do not have to provide information to the public, so 
Great Lakes’ operation records, pollution data, and procedural documents 
remain private. 
Government contractors, like Great Lakes, perform work all over the 
country. Great Lakes performs a variety of environmental projects, like the 
Great Lakes dredging operation in Miami to post-tornado waterway cleanup 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4. William Kelly, Barge Damaged Reef, Spewed Rocks During Dredging, PALM BEACH 
DAILY NEWS, Mar. 24, 2013, available at 
http://www.palmbeachdailynews.com/news/news/national/barge-damaged-reef-spewed-rocks-during-
dredging/nW22p/. 
5. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Tug Company to Pay Nearly $1 Million for 
Seagrass Damage (Dec. 20, 2002) available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2002/December/02_enrd_738.htm.  
6. Id.  
7. U.S. EPA Fines Washington State Dredging Company for Ocean Dumping Violations, 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Apr. 1, 2004), 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/f2812c1a8484b3b5852572a000650c02/fda536a7c3726f7a852
570d8005e1622!OpenDocument. 
8. 46 U.S.C. § 50101 (2006). The Jones Act requires that vessels working in United 
States waters must be three quarters United States owned.  
9. Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Corp at Deutsche Bank Securities Inc. Global 
Industrials and Basic Materials Conference—Final, FAIR DISCLOSURE WIRE 1, 4 (June 16, 2011), 
available at Westlaw, 6/16/11 FD (Fair Disclosure) Wire 14:40:00. 
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and environmental analysis for mountaintop mining. Contractors do much 
of the hazardous waste disposal and remediation projects in the nation and 
gather much of the data and analysis about the toxins in our air, ground, and 
waterways. More and more, contractors do the work of government, to the 
point where some say that the traditional requirement that only the 
government should do work that is “inherently governmental: is no longer 
applied in practice.10  
The more government work is taken over by private contractors, the 
less accessible project information is to the public. Government contractors 
are not subject to FOIA, which requires federal agencies to provide 
information to the public. 11  As contractors complete more “inherently 
governmental” work, less is known about the contractors and their projects. 
Those concerned with environmental hazards find it hard to advocate 
against these private entities cloaked in secrecy. Information plays a key 
role in educating people about environmental threats and assuring that an 
informed public can rally for or against activities that affect their 
environment. Access to information is vital for environmental progress in 
the United States, and citizens must be able to learn about environmental 
risks that may harm them.12 
The international community recognizes that information access is 
imperative to environmental safety, 13  and the United States Congress 
designs environmental laws that provide for public participation.14 Despite 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10. Paul R. Verkuil points out the futility of expecting the government to cull the 
inherently governmental tasks from competitive sourcing by quoting legal philosopher Leslie Green, 
“The idea that our leaders might have a fundamental duty to govern and to bear responsibility for doing 
so seems quaint.” Paul R. Verkuil, Outsourcing and the Duty to Govern, in GOVERNMENT BY 
CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 310, 334 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow 
eds., 2009). 
11. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 1, (2009), 
http://www.justice.gov/oip/procereq.htm. 
12. See Eric Barker, Forest Service Faces More Scrutiny, LEWISTON MORNING TRIB. July 
20, 2012, http://m.lmtribune.com/mobile/northwest/article_9d4d2050-fdc4-540f-bcd0-
61c06750823a.html (reporting discomfort and dismay among private citizens and public interest groups 
trying to gain information related to the activities of a public interest group in relation to a U.S. Forest 
Service action). 
13. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., 
June 3−14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 31 I.L.M. 874, 878 (June 14, 
1992). This 1992 declaration was reaffirmed at the 2012 Rio Conference. Principle 10 says, 
“Environmental issues are best handled with participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level. 
At the national level, each individual shall have appropriate access to information concerning the 
environment that is held by public authorities, including information on hazardous materials and 
activities in their communities, and the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes. States 
shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by making information widely 
available. Effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, 
shall be provided.” Id. 
14. David Sarokin and Jay Schulkin demonstrated that government accountability leads to 
an expansion of the government’s right to know, using the Clean Water Act and the Emergency 
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those laws, FOIA remains the main tool for gaining access to government 
information. The public often utilizes FOIA to obtain information on 
potentially harmful environmental activities. For instance, farmers recently 
used FOIA to uncover hydrogen sulfide contamination of water systems 
caused by factory farms,15 concerned local residents made FOIA requests to 
examine the oil dispersants used to clean up the BP oil spill,16 and wildlife 
advocates used FOIA to get details of a mining project planned for a forest 
near Mount St. Helens.17  
FOIA reaches its transparency limits when the government increasingly 
outsources projects to non-governmental entities outside of FOIA’s scope. 
While contractors are integral to complex and large-scale environmental 
work in the United States, the contractors’ status as private entities 
complicates public access to environmental information. America’s laws 
give more privacy leeway to private entities. Even when performing 
government tasks, “private entities are not treated simply as part of the 
state.”18 This remains true even if the government uses these contractors to 
perform important state or state-like functions.19 The opacity of contractors’ 
information impedes many environmental laws designed to improve 
oversight of shared resources.  
This article proposes using contract clauses in the government 
contracting process to improve the transparency of information among 
federal government contractors involved in environmental tasks. Part I of 
this paper explores FOIA, government contracting in the United States, and 
the dangers posed by limiting access to environmental information in 
contractors’ work. Part II looks at the proliferation of environmental 
contractors and the damaging effects of increased contracting on the 
transparency goals of FOIA. Part III proposes contractual solutions to 
provide FOIA-like transparency requirements for projects undertaken by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 as examples of the federal government using the 
public’s access to information as a tool of environmental policy. See David Sarokin & Jay Schulkin, 
Environmentalism and the Right to Know: Expanding the Practice of Democracy, 4 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 
175, 180–84 (1991). 
15. Yvonne Zipp, One Farmer Acts to Save Environment from Factory Farms, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, (Apr. 26, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Making-a-
difference/2010/0426/One-farmer-acts-to-save-environment-from-factory-farms. 
16. Activists Petition EPA for Oil Spill Dispersant Toxicity Criteria, Testing, 
INSIDEEPA.COM, (Oct. 13, 2010), http://insideepa.com/201010132341573/EPA-Daily-News/Daily-
News/activists-petition-epa-for-oil-spill-dispersant-toxicity-criteria-testing/menu-id-95.html.   
17. Bianca Fortis, Environmental Group Cautions About Impacts of Potential Mine, THE 
CHRONICLE (Centralia, Washington), Oct. 21, 2011, available at 
http://biancafortis.com/2201/12/environmental-group-cautions-about-impacts-of-potential-mine/. 
18. Mark Fenster, Seeing the State: Transparency as Metaphor, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 617, 
649 (2010). 
19. Id. 
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federal government contractors. Part IV addresses critiques of utilizing 
contract clauses to address environmental transparency. By requiring 
contractors to sign contracts that include clauses requiring disclosure of 
environmentally sensitive information, requiring public participation and 
reporting, and providing incentives for information disclosures, the federal 
government will assure that the public has access to information vital for 
preserving human health and environmental safety. When contractors 
participate in agency undertakings, environmental advocates should be 
treated more like consumers or shareholders whose taxes pay the bills and 
less like market competitors deprived of information in order to protect 
corporate interests.20 
Contractors, when tasked with a government assignment, should be 
required to provide transparency so the public can be assured the contractor 
does not deviate from the public interest. Great Lakes and other private 
entities performing government tasks fail to protect the best interests of the 
public thereby putting people and communities at risk. 21  A lack of 
transparency makes corruption, a disregard for rules and regulations, and 
overall mistreatment of people and their environment possible behind walls 
of secrecy.22 Although the United States need not eliminate contracting or 
make things unduly difficult for contractors, whose work is integral to 
America’s growth and progress, it should adopt contracting policies that 
assure public access to information.   
I: FOIA’S VITAL ROLE IN ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND HUMAN SAFETY 
A. FOIA: America’s Transparency Guarantee 
“A popular Government, without popular information, or the 
means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; 
or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: 
And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm 
themselves with the power which knowledge gives.”23 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20. David S. Levine, Secrecy and Unaccountability: Trade Secrets in Our Public 
Infrastructure, 59 FLA. L. REV. 135, 173 (2007). 
21. See, e.g., Laura A. Dickinson, Public Values/Private Contract, in GOVERNMENT BY 
CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 335, 335 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow 
eds., 2009). 
22. Steven Aftergood, Reducing Government Secrecy: Finding What Works, 27 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 399, 399 (2009). 
23. Letter from James Madison to W. T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION, at document 35 (1987), available at http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch18s35.html.  
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Freedom of information is vital to a successful democracy. FOIA 
facilitates the watchdog function of the public over the government to 
ensure that government officials act in the public interest.24 The law creates 
a judicially enforceable public right of access to the information compiled 
by federal agencies.25 
Justice Brandeis wrote, “[p]ublicity is justly commended as a remedy 
for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of 
disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman."26 Environmental 
protection hinges on the public’s “right to know” about environmental 
threats.27 According to the EPA, citizen groups use environmental data 
collected by the government to help educate communities, identify 
environmental issues, and engage in negotiation for regulation of 
environmental undertakings.28 
FOIA is the nation’s main tool for prying environmental information 
from the sometimes-reluctant government. Signed into law in 1966, FOIA 
requires federal agencies to disclose their activities to the public.29 The law 
assures that anyone in the United States, including Miami citizens, can look 
into business conducted by federal agencies, like plans to dredge the earth 
beneath their coastlines. Under FOIA, any person has an enforceable right 
to obtain agency records about projects affecting the environment or 
anything else.30 FOIA is America’s major transparency law, opening the 
government for public view. International environmental organizations tout 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24. Fred H. Cate, D. Annette Fields & James K. McBain, The Right to Privacy and the 
Public’s Right to Know: The “Central Purpose” of the Freedom of Information Act, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 
41, 42 (1994). 
25. Martin E. Halstuk & Bill F. Chamberlin, The Freedom of Information Act 1966–2006: 
A Retrospective on the Rise of Privacy Protection Over the Public Interest in Knowing What the 
Government’s Up To, 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 511, 512 (2006). 
26. Justice Louis D. Brandeis, BRANDEIS UNIV., 
http://www.brandeis.edu/legacyfund/bio.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2013). 
27. Katherine Chekouras, Balancing National Security with a Community’s Right-to-
Know: Maintaining Public Access to Environmental Information Through EPCRA’s Non-Preemption, 
34 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 107, 125 (2007) (citing Thomas C. Beierle, The Benefits and Costs of 
Disclosing Information About Risks: What Do We Know About Right-to-Know?, 24 RISK ANALYSIS 
335, 336 (2004) and Daniel J. Fiorino, Citizen Participation and Environmental Risk, 15 SCI. TECH., & 
HUM. VALUES 226, 227 (1990)). 
28. In a report about its Toxics Release Inventory program, the EPA listed many specific 
examples where citizen activists and community organizations educated their citizens or residents about 
toxic chemicals, “often combining education with a call to action.” ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF 
INFO. ANALYSIS & ACCESS, EPA-260-R-002-004, HOW ARE THE TOXICS RELEASE INVENTORY DATA 
USED?—GOVERNMENT, BUSINESS, ACADEMIC & CITIZEN USES 3–9 (2003). See also Chekouras, supra 
note 27, at 125 (discussing how citizens use TRI data to educate communities, identify environmental 
concerns, and work to reduce pollution). 
29. Sarah Lamdan, Protecting the Freedom of Information Act Requestor: Privacy for 
Information Seekers, 21 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 221, 224 (2012). 
30. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 1 (2009), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/foia_guide09/introduction.pdf. 
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FOIA as a model for the transparency needed to foster progress in the 
environmental protection movement. 31  FOIA is supposed to prevent 
government secrecy and allow people to know “what their government is 
up to.”32 States have also enacted Freedom of Information (FOI) laws for 
state agencies.33 
FOIA’s importance has increased over the last few decades as 
environmental and public safety regulatory schemes have grown. Some 
argue this growth gives too much power to federal environmental 
agencies.34 The regulatory growth conditions the assurance that the FOIA 
would keep the agencies accountable for the consequences of their new 
environmental and public safety regulatory responsibilities.35 FOIA, which 
far pre-dates the new regulations and serves as a fundamental transparency 
commandment for federal agencies, was a precondition for the extra 
regulatory power given to the agencies. As these agencies give more power 
to contractors, the quid pro quo promise of transparency is thwarted, and 
FOIA’s information access dissolves. 
The federal FOIA and state FOI laws are an integral part of the 
interplay between government agendas and the public’s voice on important 
national undertakings. This interplay is vital to staving off common 
governmental ailments that lead to iniquities. We need sunlight to prevent 
agency capture and regulatory slippage and to monitor for market failures 
that could lead to environmental detriment. Each of these can lead to 
environmental failures in the United States.  
B. Agency Capture 
Shining transparency’s light onto agency dealings with contractors is 
necessary to “disinfect” the relationships from undue influence.36 Agency 
capture, the undue influence of private industry on agencies’ processes and 
actions, can lead to regulatory deviation from the public interest. Because 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31. FRANCES IRWIN & CARL BRUCH, Public Access to Information, Participation, and 
Justice, in STUMBLING TOWARDS SUSTAINABILITY 511, 511 (John C. Dernbach ed., 2002). 
32. Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 171 (2004) (quoting U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989)). 
33. Many websites contain links to every state’s FOI law. For example, the National 
Freedom of Information Coalition provides links to all states’ and the District of Columbia’s FOI and 
open meetings laws. See Freedom of Information Laws, NAT’L FREEDOM OF INFO. COAL., 
http://www.nfoic.org/state-freedom-of-information-laws (last visited Nov. 5, 2013) (providing links to 
information on various State Freedom of Information laws). 
34.	   See Marlo Lewis, Jr., Bureaucrats Have Gone Rogue, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/08/24/what-if-republicans-closed-the-epa/the-epa-has-
gone-rogue (arguing that the EPA has vastly exceeded its powers under the Clean Air Act).	  
35. Id. 
36.	   See supra, note 26 accompanying text.  
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contractors are often large, highly structured organizations, they can 
monitor agencies more closely and react to agency challenges more rapidly 
than can most citizens or public interest organizations. Private entities can 
use monitoring to deter agency behavior that benefits the public and instead 
encourage agency behaviors that benefit private enterprise. Ordinarily, 
individual citizens and public interest groups lack the funding, resources, 
and industry to similarly affect agency views and to assure that agencies act 
in the public interest.37  
For example, in Paducah, Kentucky, in the late 1990’s, workers at a 
uranium enrichment plant were told by Union Carbide, a Department of 
Energy contractor running the plant, that the plant was not releasing a toxic 
level of radiation even as workers suffered cancer and other radiation-
related illnesses. 38  Physicians for Social Responsibility, cites the 
“incestuous relationship between the US Government . . . and the large 
corporations doing most of the contracted work” for contamination 
exposure at nuclear sites like Paducah and the Hanford Site in 
Washington.39 Only after FOIA allowed the public to review Hanford 
documents from the 1940s and 1950s were citizens able to see documentary 
evidence of “the incredible contamination of the environment and exposure 
of large numbers of citizens to dangerous amounts of radioactive nuclides 
[from] Hanford’s earlier years.” 40  The contractors’ influence on the 
government led to an information cover-up that harmed plant workers. This 
cover-up could only be discovered through information transparency and 
public whistleblowing  
When contractors regularly perform government functions, they can 
assert improper influence on those functions.41 Regulatory capture can lead 
to catastrophic failures—BP's disastrous 2010 Gulf oil spill is perhaps the 
clearest example of how this kind of agency capture can destroy regulatory 
function.42 In 2008, the New York Times described one example of capture 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37. Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional 
Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 22 (2010). 
38. Arjun Makhijani, Paducah—Never Again, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 1999, at A15, 
available at http://ieer.org/resource/health-and-safety/paducah-never-again/. 
39. Hanford History: How Did We Get Where We Are?, PHYSICIANS FOR SOC. 
RESPONSIBILITY, http://www.psr.org/chapters/washington/hanford/hanford-history.html (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2013).  
40. Id. 
41. LAURA A. DICKINSON, OUTSOURCING WAR & PEACE 117 (2011). 
42. Regulatory Capture Realized: The Oil Industry and the MMS Regulatory Agency, THE 
WORDEN REP. (Mar. 8, 2011), http://thewordenreport.blogspot.com/2011/03/regulatory-capture-
realized-oil.html. 
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by contractors in an environmental context.43 The article depicts a “culture 
of ethical failure” pervasive in the Mineral Management Service (MMS), 
the arm of the Department of the Interior that collects oil and gas royalties. 
In several instances, former MMS employees returned to the MMS as 
consultants, creating overlaps between government functions and the 
private interests advanced by the former employees through close 
relationships. 44  Additionally, MMS’s leasing and revenue collection 
operations were not separate from the public safety and environmental 
enforcement side of the MMS. Staff biologists were often pressured by 
agency officials to change the findings of their studies if they predicted that 
an accident would likely occur. 45  Scientists’ findings were routinely 
overruled.46 One scientist said, “You simply are not allowed to conclude 
that the drilling will have an impact,” or the MMS would rewrite the 
document.47  The indiscretions and unethical behavior described in the 
article foreshadowed what would happen two years later. In 2010, the 
Center for Biological Diversity accused MMS of mismanaging the 
contractors that caused the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill in the Louisiana 
Gulf.48 
Sometimes, capture occurs systemically through regulatory schemes. 
For example, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act (CERCLA) requires the government to hire contractors to 
carry out Superfund site cleanups.49 Private engineering firms carry out the 
site investigation, assessment of remedial alternatives, and remedial 
action.50 “No sites would be cleaned up by America’s Superfund system if 
it were not for the army of contractors willing to profit from the work of 
planning and executing cleanups.”51 In 1989, an Office of Technology 
Assessment (OTA) study found evidence that contractors captured the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43. Charlie Savage, Sex, Drug Use and Graft Cited in Interior Department, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 10, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/11/washington/11royalty.html. 
44. Id. 
45. Ian Urbina, U.S. Said to Allow Drilling Without Needed Permits, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/14/us/14agency.html. 
46. Regulatory Capture Realized: The Oil Industry and the MMS Regulatory Agency, 
WORDEN REP. (Mar. 8, 2011), http://thewordenreport.blogspot.com/2011/03/regulatory-capture-
realized-oil.html.  
47. Id.  
48.  Urbina, supra note 45. 
49. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 9604 (2006) (giving the President the authority to act to arrange for removal of hazardous 
substance). 
50. CAROLINE N. BROUN & JAMES T. O’REILLY, RCRA & SUPERFUND: A PRACTICE 
GUIDE § 10:23 (3d ed. 2013). 
51. Id. 
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Superfund program.52 The OTA revealed that pollution cleanup duties are 
often awarded to the very firms that polluted the land.53 In short, the same 
firms that pollute get paid to clean up their self-made messes.54 This is 
especially worrisome because the law requires CERCLA contractors to 
self-police.55 Professor Bradford Mank describes the dependent relationship 
between agencies and private contractors in Superfund cleanups as a 
symbiotic relationship where Superfund contractors prosper by taking 
advantage of the federal government.56   
C. Regulatory Slippage 
Another reason that transparency is necessary in environmental 
activities conducted through government contract is to prevent regulatory 
slippage. The attenuation of government activities from government 
direction can lead to inadequate oversight and quality control. Inadequate 
oversight flourishes because contractors lack the central focus and work 
force dedicated to regulatory compliance of federal agencies. Contractors 
disregard environmental compliance and other legal obligations, creating 
risks for national security, human health, and the environment.57 Sunlight 
allows the public to monitor environmental processes to assure 
accountability where government oversight is lacking.  
Miriam Seifter defines regulatory slippage as “a failure to take 
regulatory action or a decision to take action less rigorous than promulgated 
requirements mandate.”58 In a study of CERCLA contractors working in 
Massachusetts, Seifter discovered widespread regulatory slippage.59 She 
reported that contractors cut corners, failed to properly manage procedures 
and oversight, and did not discipline personnel to prevent malpractice or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52. U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, ASSESSING CONTRACTOR USE IN 
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(1989). The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), was a Congressional office designed to provide 
Congress with analysis of complex scientific and technical issues. The OTA operated from 1972–1995. 
See generally, Office of Technology Assessment, THE OTA LEGACY, http://www.princeton.edu/~ota/ 
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34, 80 (1993). 
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Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009). 
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incentivize good behavior. Seifter used the example of contracting out 
hazardous waste remediation on an abandoned lot containing toxic 
pollutants in preparation for building a school on the grounds.60 She found 
that in these cleanup situations, contractors were motivated to 
“underenforce” federal regulations because they had an interest in cost-
cutting and convenience, and little fear of getting caught violating the 
rules.61  
Contractors’ disregard for regulatory controls is a result of monitoring 
failures that allow environmental safeguards to fall through the cracks. 
According to Seifter, the Massachusetts Department of Environmental 
Protection hardly even monitors the contractors, and the agency is unable to 
perceive the sources or extent of regulatory slippage. 62  The lack of 
structured rules and regulations governing contractors’ activities protects 
their bad habits. “At best, the current laws governing contractors amount to 
a makeshift legal framework.”63 While agencies, like contractors, can also 
suffer slippage if left to their own devices, strict disclosure requirements 
and legal accountability measures keep agencies on track.64 Contractors can 
bypass the transparency and accountability requirements controlling 
government agencies, allowing the contractors’ slippage to go unchecked.65  
As Gillian E. Metzger explains, the current policy for privatization 
involves completely separate rules to govern private and government 
entities.66 Private entities are given a lot of leeway, making their own day-
to-day decisions, getting trade secret and business information privacy, and 
implementing plans in the manner they select.67 Conversely, government 
entities are highly regulated and controlled by legislative, executive, and 
judicial powers, as well as subject to public participation.68 The laws of the 
United States treat non-governmental entities like contractors differently 
than government entities. Despite the growing role of private entities in 
government work, government contractors are rarely held to the standards 
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62. Id. at 105. 
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Diversity, 28 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 497, 508−09 (2001); 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (2006); 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1251 et seq. (2006). 
65. Silveira, supra note 64. 
66. Gillian E. Metzger, Private Delegations, Due Process, and the Duty to Supervise, in 
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of “state actors.”69 Metzger describes the separate legal requirements for 
private and government entities as parallel binary systems that give private 
companies room for slippage.70 
D. Market Failure 
Transparency is also necessary so the public can assure that federal 
agencies try to minimize market failures in contractor situations that bring 
private market players into governmental roles. All sorts of failures occur in 
the free market; regulatory agencies have a duty to correct these failures 
and infuse the public’s best interests into market processes. In the 
government contractor setting, externalities (the failure of the market to 
ascribe value to social costs), such as environmental detriment, are 
particularly insidious and easy to miss without oversight. Most free market 
enterprises do not calculate a price for pollution and environmental damage, 
like the costs of a destroyed coral reef to environmental welfare. If not 
properly observed and regulated, contractors can choose economic 
prosperity over environmental protection without any negative 
consequences to their bottom line.  
Additionally, environmental resources are easy to exploit in the free 
market because they cannot advocate for themselves and are often a 
necessary scapegoat for advancement. One can discount the importance of a 
healthy environment when the natural resources on which we depend have 
a high market value and appear to be in ample supply. For example, while 
clean air is just as important as more tangible resources, the open market 
puts a price on coal and timber but not clean air.71  
Because the free market lacks a moral imperative for stewardship of the 
environment, many development operations pollute surrounding air and 
nearby waterways, leaving the cleanup costs with municipalities and their 
citizens who suffer the economic consequences. This is especially true in 
environmental situations where projects are often carried out near 
vulnerable populations. “Children, the elderly, the poor, and those in 
confinement for reasons of health or imprisonment—are largely excluded 
from participation in the market . . . .”72 For example, toxic smoke released 
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70. Id. at 291. 
71. MARK SAGOFF, SHOULD MARKETS DECIDE?, 1 L. OF ENVTL. PROT. § 5:9 (2013), 
available at Westlaw 1 L. of Envtl. Prot. § 5:9. 
72. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Privatization and Democracy: Resources in Administrative Law, 
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& Martha Minow eds., 2009). 
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from prospering factories, runoff released from animal waste from 
successful factory farms, and the destruction of fish populations caused 
when a dam builder finishes his work, all create negative effects on people 
who live nearby. Fishermen, the poor families living in the factory-adjacent 
building lot, and retired farm families on neighboring acreage will suffer 
economic difficulties and diminished quality of life.  
Sometimes, the populace needs government intervention to save it from 
market failures. When the market fails to account for human suffering or 
imminent harm to society, the state often triggers responses for those 
failures.73  If the free market goes too far afoul of human safety the 
government intervenes, as it did during the 1970s with the development of 
environmental protection legislation. 74  This type of government 
intervention is important for protecting the environment, as businesses often 
exploit natural resources to drive market successes. Without transparency, 
government contractors can sacrifice human health and safety for market 
gain without the public knowing. Public advocacy for the silent, but 
important, natural resources requires public knowledge of contractors and 
their operations. Environmental advocates need contractors’ information to 
advance environmental protection causes. 
II: A PROLIFERATION OF CONTRACTORS OBSCURES FOIA’S REACH AND 
THWARTS ITS PURPOSE 
A. Increasing Reliance on Contractors 
Throughout American history, the government has used contractors to 
carry out many regulatory functions.75 Private enterprise has brought about 
some of the greatest innovations in history, and private contractors have 
allowed the United States to reach otherwise unattainable goals. On many 
fronts, our nation’s success is due to the work and expertise of the 
government’s contracted assistants.  
For example, imagine NASA operations without the help of contracted 
scientists and engineers to design shuttles, arrange projects, and track 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73. Id. at 268. 
74. Silveira, supra note 64 at 508−09; 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (2006); 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et 
seq. (2006). 
75. Jody Freeman & Martha Minow, Introduction: Reframing the Outsourcing Debates, in 
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 1, 6 (Jody Freeman & 
Martha Minow eds., 2009) (offering a historical overview of government contracting in the United 
States). 
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NASA missions.76 War efforts rely on contractor designed-and-constructed 
tanks, armored vehicles, and tools of combat. Contractors have created the 
plans, provided the tools, supplied the brute force, and lent their intellect to 
some of our nation’s greatest challenges.77 “In many instances, there are 
genuine advantages to relying on the private sector, including for-profit and 
non-profit organizations, for expertise, innovation, energy, and 
flexibility.”78  
Federal government contractors have proliferated in recent decades. 
Beyond launching space shuttles and fighting wars, a growing number of 
“mundane” government tasks are being outsourced. Since 1945, the amount 
of public government work conducted by private contractors has been 
growing, and the division between public and private workforces has 
steadily declined.79 Now, contractors do “the basic work of government.”80 
Contractors write regulations and budgets, produce reports, interpret laws, 
deliver social services, manage nuclear weapons sites, and other functions 
that were once wholly conducted by government officers.81 The amount of 
research and development spending by the United States government 
dropped from 67% in 1960 to 26% in 2000, as the private sector took over 
the “development and provision of public infrastructure.”82  
Not only has outsourcing increased and expanded to cover “mundane” 
tasks, but the amount of responsibility granted to non-governmental entities 
has also grown. The term “public-private partnership” was coined in the last 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76. For example, NASA’s Space Flight Operations Contract with its contractor, United 
Space Alliance, provided the company $10 billion to handle virtually every aspect of a shuttle mission 
from astronaut training and system assembly to operations management during flight. See John D. 
Donahue, The Transformation of Government Work: Causes, Consequences, and Distortions, in 
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 41, 58−61 (Jody Freeman & 
Martha Minow eds., 2009). 
77. Contractors play major roles in many national undertakings, including serving in 
paramilitary CIA units and preparing surveillance and targeting plans in Afghanistan and restoring the 
site of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, cleaning up following Hurricane Katrina, and helping to repair the Gulf 
Coast environments damaged by the BP oil spill. See Christina M. Blyth, Minding the Liability Gap: 
American Contractors, Iraq, and the Outsourcing of Impunity, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 651, 656−57 
(2008); Trade Group Praises Legislation Limiting Contractor Litigation Risk from Katrina Efforts, 47 
GOV’T CONTRACTOR 423 (2005), available at Westlaw 47 No. 37 Gov’t Contractor 423 (describing the 
valuable role of private contractors in disaster relief following Hurricane Katrina and 9/11). 
78. Freeman & Minow, supra note 76, at 15. 
79. Dominique Custos & John Reitz, Public-Private Partnerships, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 555, 
564 (2010). 
80. Freeman & Minow, supra note 76, at 2. 
81. Id. 
82. Levine, supra note 20, at 142. Also, in 2005, the U.S. General Accounting Office’s 
Department of Acquisition and Sourcing Management reported that there was an 86% increase in 
government private sector goods and services spending between 2000 and 2005. MINORITY STAFF 
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS DIV., U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON GOV’T REFORM, 
DOLLARS, NOT SENSE: GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING UNDER THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION i (2006). 
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two decades to denote “government contracts in which the private 
contractor takes on more responsibility than has been customary in the past 
for the delivery of the services contracted for.”83 Through public-private 
partnerships, the government shifts much of the financing, maintenance, 
and operation of public infrastructure to private contractors. The increased 
use of public-private partnerships reflects a new enthusiasm for privatizing 
government functions. 
The lines between “public” and “private” influences on government 
undertakings blur, despite the fact that the laws are still quite “binary” in 
separating rules governing public entities and those guiding the 
government.84 Transparency guarantees, like FOIA, have no power over 
private entities and no similar laws exist to require contracted companies to 
be transparent. 
B. Proliferation of Contractors Doing Environmental Work 
More than ever, federal agencies are using contractors to carry out work 
that affects the environment.85 A 1992 report stated that EPA contract 
obligations increased from $600 million in 1986 to approximately $1.4 
billion in 1992. 86  In 2010, the EPA spent $413 million on private 
contractors for Superfund alone.87 EPA contractors lend specific technical 
expertise for short-term projects.88 External contractors are also easier to 
hire and fund than long-term internal employees.89   
Not only has outsourcing increased, contractors now perform tasks 
once reserved for internal agency officials. “As early as 1989, it was 
uncovered during Senate hearings that EPA contractors were drafting 
budget documents, overseeing field investigators, drafting responses to 
public comments during the rulemaking process and writing regulation 
preambles, and organizing and conducting public hearings.”90  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83. Custos & Reitz, supra note 79, at 555. 
84. Aman, supra note 72, at 269–70. 
85. See generally ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 53 (describing EPA’s increasing 
reliance on private contractors). Also see statistics like “The Department of Energy spends over 90 
percent of its budget on contracts, including contracts to operate research laboratories, maintain nuclear 
weapons stockpiles, and clean up radioactive and hazardous wastes resulting from weapons production.” 
Mendelson, supra note 3, at 242. 
86.	   ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA08: REFORM EPA’S CONTRACT MANAGEMENT PROCESS, 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/reports/EPA8.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2013).	  
87. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., REPORT No. 12-P-0360, EPA 
SUPERFUND CONTRACT INITIATIVES & CONTROLS TO REDUCE FRAUD, WASTE, AND ABUSE 2 (2012).  
88.	   ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 53.	  
89.	   Id.	  
90. Steven J. Kelman, Achieving Contracting Goals and Recognizing Public Concerns: A 
Contracting Management Perspective, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN 
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C. Contractors Carry Out an Array of Environmental Tasks 
The EPA Office of Acquisition Management (OAM) uses Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Subpart 37.101 to describe the role of their 
service contractors.91 A service contract “directly engages the time and 
effort of a contractor whose primary purpose is to perform an identifiable 
task rather than to furnish an end item of supply.”92 These tasks include 
maintenance, operations services, technical support, and management 
support services.93 The EPA hires contractors for consulting, regulatory 
enforcement, auditing, managing, preparing analysis and reports, and other 
administrative operations.94 Ecologists, engineers, chemists, and suppliers 
of manpower, as well as scholars and managers, are just some of the people 
hired by the EPA in a contractor capacity.95 
The only tasks that contractors cannot perform are “inherently 
governmental functions,” which are activities “so intimately related to the 
public interest as to mandate performance by Government employees.”96 
The EPA defines “inherently governmental functions” as activities 
requiring “the exercise of value judgment in making decisions for the 
government.”97 This definition seems like it would include many of the 
agency’s functions. However, upon closer inspection, many activities fall 
outside of the “inherent government function” parameters, and most 
activities can be outsourced.98 This is especially true as government budgets 







	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
DEMOCRACY 153, 177 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009). See also id. at 204−06 (quoting 
PAUL C. LIGHT, TRUE SIZE OF GOVERNMENT 13−14 (1999)). 
91.	   48 C.F.R. § 37.101 (2007); OFFICE OF ACQUISITION MGMT., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, SUPPORT SERVICE CONTRACTING: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW AS A FEDERAL EMPLOYEE 1 
(2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/oam/inventory/FY2011/attach4.pdf.	  
92. Id. 
93. See Burka v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 87 F.3d 508, 515 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(finding data tapes created and possessed by contractor were under “constructive control” of agency 
because of agency’s extensive supervision). 
94. OFFICE OF ACQUISITION MGMT., supra note 90, at 1−2. 
95.	   Id. at 1.	  
96. Id. at 2. 
97.	   Id.	  
98.	   Id.	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D. Contractor Documents Are Not Agency Records 
Citizens cannot use FOIA to obtain contractor materials because FOIA 
only applies to “agency records.”99 In 1980, the Supreme Court decided in 
Forsham v. Harris that federal participation in, and funding of, the 
generation of information by a privately controlled organization does not 
render that information an “agency record” under FOIA.100 Nine years after 
the Forsham decision, the Supreme Court developed a two-part test for 
“agency records” in United States Department of Justice v. Tax Analysts.101 
Under this test, a document is an agency record only if it is (1) created or 
obtained by an agency and (2) under agency control at the time of FOIA 
request. 
The Supreme Court has, in limited instances, defined some contractor-
generated documents as “agency records.”102 In Hercules, Inc. v. Marsh, the 
court held that a telephone directory, created for an Army ammunition plant 
by a contractor at government expense, was an agency record. 103 Also, the 
D.C. Circuit Court found that contractor recordings created under agency 
supervision are “agency records.”104 The District of New Mexico has held 
that, where agencies express that they intend to retain control over records 
created by contractors, the records are “agency records.”105 In contrast, 
other federal courts have found that computer tapes maintained by 
contractors outside of agency control are not “agency records”, nor are 
records not possessed or controlled by an agency.106 Overall, there is no 
decisive rule governing whether contractor creations and holdings are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Procedural Requirements, GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF 
INFORMATION ACT 27, 33 (2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/foia_guide09/procedural-
requirements.pdf (hereinafter Procedural Requirements). 
100. Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 171 (1980). 
101. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 144–45 (1989). 
102. Procedural Requirements, supra note 98, at 75. 
103. Hercules, Inc. v. Marsh, 839 F.2d 1027, 1029 (4th Cir. 1988). 
	   104. Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Reg. Comm’n, 975 F.2d 871, 879 (D.C. Cir. 
1992). 
105. See Los Alamos Study Grp. v. Dep’t of Energy, No. 97–1412, slip op. at 4 (D. N.M. 
July 22, 1998) (finding records created by contractor are agency records because the contract established 
agency intent to retain control over records). See also  Procedural Requirements, supra note 98, at 
35−36 nn.67−68. 
106. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 36 (2009), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/foia_guide09.htm for a discussion of Rush Franklin Publ'g, Inc. 
v. NASA, No. 90-CV-2855, slip op. at 10 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 1993) (holding that computer tape 
maintained by contractor is not an agency record when there is no agency control).; See also Sangre de 
Cristo Animal Prot., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, No. 96–1059, slip op. at 4–6 (D. N.M. Mar. 10, 1998) 
(holding that records not possessed or controlled by an agency but created by entity under contract with 
agency are not agency records, but are accessible under agency regulation requiring public availability 
of some Dep’t. of Energy contractor records). 
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“agency records,” and the majority of decisions give deference to 
contractors’ privacy. 
Congress has never moved to increase contractor transparency in a 
meaningful way. In 2007, Congress slightly expanded the definition of 
“agency record” to cover records kept by government contractors 
performing recordkeeping functions for the purposes of records 
management.107 This expansion does apply to contractors’ materials, but it 
merely covers distinct situations where agencies relinquish possession of 
their records to a contractor “for the purposes of records management.”108 
The amendment keeps agency records within FOIA’s parameters—“even 
though they are no longer in the physical custody of the agency”—but it 
does not reach further to encompass contractor-created materials. 109 
Situations where contractors serve “recordkeeping” functions include those 
where contractors are hired to “store, organize, or manage” agency 
records.110 Beyond that, Congress has not extended FOIA to contractor 
materials. 
FOIA practitioner guides similarly identify “agency records” as 
documents in an agency’s possession or otherwise under the agency’s 
exclusive control.111 Materials outside of agency walls are not likely to fall 
under FOIA. Documents from the actual contracting procurement process 
are one of the few exceptions to this rule and are readily available to the 
public.112 However, documents from the procurement process do not greatly 
enhance contractor transparency, as they do not offer information about the 
actual performance of the government contract (like pollution data, outlines 
of project plans, evidence of project oversight, etc.). Documentation of the 
contract’s performance, not the procurement process, contain the 
information needed to protect public safety and health.. 
Not only do contractors escape FOIA requirements, there are also 
exemptions built into FOIA that are especially suited to protect private 
company information. Trade secrets, business information, and privileged 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107. Openness Promotes Effectiveness in our National Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. 
No. 110-175 (codified as 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(2) (2006)). 
108. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF INFO. AND PRIVACY, Treatment of Agency Records 
Maintained for an Agency by a Government Contractor for Purposes of Records Management, FOIA 
POST (Sept. 9, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/foiapost/agencyrecords.htm. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. Paul G. Dembling et al., Access to Contractor Records Under the Freedom of 
Information Act, in 2-10 FEDERAL CONTRACT MANAGEMENT 10.15 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., 
2011). 
112. Jacquelyn L. Stanley, Make Transparency Your Business: The Federal Awardee 
Performance and Integrity Information System and Its Implications for Contractors, 41 PUB. CONT. L.J. 
685, 686 (2012). 
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work product are just a few of the exemptions contractors can use to 
squirrel away information from public view. Contractors can also file 
reverse-FOIA lawsuits to protect requested documents from release to the 
public. 
E. Contractors Do Not Have to Keep Records 
Private contractors are free to work without much public disclosure. 
Contractors are not tasked with documenting their activities for the 
purposes of public oversight. There are not recordkeeping laws or 
regulations that require contractors to keep records or provide all of their 
documents to agencies. Unless there is a complaint entered into a court that 
demands review of a final agency action—and that action involves 
contractor records—there is never a time where records have to be handed 
over to anyone.113  
Even if there is a complaint that calls for agency review, by the time 
litigation has commenced, compiling a paper trail may be nearly 
impossible. Craig D. Galli, a litigator advising contractors preparing 
environmental impact statements, says that it is nearly impossible to gather 
materials for judicial review and this “virtually guarantees” that the record 
will be haphazard and incomplete.114 Even if contractors create paper trails 
and the government does successfully oversee their activities, the lack of 
transparency rules leave contractors’ activities largely inaccessible, 
especially by the time litigation arises.115  
F. Contractors Do Not Have Transparency Requirements 
Even if contractors choose to keep thorough records, they do not have 
to share them. FOIA, the federal government’s most important and far-
reaching transparency law, does not apply to government contractors.116 
Nothing in FOIA accounts for third parties carrying out government work, 
and most of FOIA’s policy relating to contractors protects information in 
contractor bids (during the acquisition process) from other potential 
contractors. The government’s interest in attracting quality contractors and 
its national policy of promoting corporate privacy to stimulate development 
(such as protecting trade secrets and financial information) prevents the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113. Craig D. Galli, The Project Proponent, Third-Party Contractors, and the 
Administrative Record, ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL L. INST., SPEC. INST. ON THE NAT’L ENVTL. POL’Y 
ACT 8, available at Westlaw 2010 No. 4 RMMLF-INST Paper No. 9 (2010). 
114. Id. 
115. Freeman & Minow, supra note 75, at 3, 5. 
116. Id. at 10.  
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government from implementing transparency measures for its contractors. 
The procurement process focuses on the issues facing potential contractors, 
not on public welfare or the transparency of contractors after they are 
awarded the contract.117 
Transparency disparities between the government and its contractors 
arise from the different goals of private enterprise and democratic 
government. Government and private businesses operate from opposing 
perspectives. The private sector is guarded, protecting its precious trade 
secrets and maintaining financial opacity. 118  Conversely, government 
benefits from open democracy and the dissemination of information.119  
The divergence of contractor treatment versus government treatment is 
built into the foundation of the United States government. The federal 
government and the laws that regulate its behavior were not designed for 
commercial venues. Government commercial activity is notably absent 
from both our traditional view of government and core democratic values, 
and it is in that absence that the conflict between trade secrecy and 
democratic values resides.120 Although contractors are private entities, they 
should not be exempt from adherence to public values when they are 
performing government functions.121 Other nations have recognized the 
need for equal transparency measures for government contractors. In 
Hungary “the transparency and controllability of the privatization 
processes, as public interest, takes precedence over the private interest of 
protection of business secrets.”122  
As government contracting increases, the web of governmental and 
corporate forces working together to complete government tasks as a single 
workforce makes transparency all the more complicated.123  Combining 
government and private activity obscures the boundaries of government 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117. Kelman, supra note 90, at 153. 
118. SEC Disclosure Laws and Regulations, INC., http://www.inc.com/encyclopedia/sec-
disclosure-laws-and-regulations.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2013) (stating that the SEC forces some 
revelations through public disclosure and reporting laws, but information excluded from those mandates 
are tightly held and not released). 
119. Levine, supra note 20, at 157. 
120. Id. at 164. 
121. See Martha Minow, Partners, Not Rivals?: Redrawing the Lines Between Public and 
Private, Non-Profit and Profit, and Secular and Religious, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1061, 1091 (2000) 
(explaining that contracting should not exempt the resulting activities from adherence to public values). 
122. Levine, supra note 20, at 165. 
123. Mark Fenster explains that the government’s organizational complexity increases when 
it delegates its authority to private entities, which decreases visibility to the public. He writes that, “to 
the extent that current law limits the FOIA’s applicability to new governance efforts, then the new 
governance approach appears significantly less than perfectly transparent.” Fenster, supra note 18, at 
649–50.	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activity when drafting and enforcing rules to govern functions that “appear 
governmental.” 
Under current laws, citizens cannot use FOIA to find out how 
government contractors are exercising their discretion.124 Private companies 
do not have to comply with FOIA, which is only meant to ensure access to 
government information.125 Because no comprehensive legislative scheme 
governs contractors, they “function under a patchwork of laws and 
doctrines, many of which were designed primarily for other purposes. At 
best, the current laws governing contractors amount to a makeshift legal 
framework.”126  
III: IMPROVING ENVIRONMENTAL TRANSPARENCY WITH CLAUSES IN 
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS 
Many solutions have been suggested to increase the transparency of 
government contractors. National security contracting has been analyzed at 
length, exposing the types of contractor practices that turn companies like 
Blackwater and Halliburton into household names that demonstrate the ugly 
underworld of government outsourcing. National security scholars have 
determined that contractor oversight is an “inherently governmental 
function that, by law, should not be outsourced.”127 Governmental oversight 
requires information access.  
Experts also suggest that government favor transparency, as there is 
little value in obscuring information from the public. These experts claim 
that full disclosure of chemical hazard information would enhance national 
security, rather than diminish it, because it would allow communities to 
prepare for attacks, accidents, and other catastrophes through proper 
planning and preparation.128 
Some legislative changes have been suggested to reach oversight and 
transparency ideals. Although legislative changes may be useful, this paper 
focuses on contractual changes. Utilizing the very document that binds 
government and contractor provides both parties with obligations that are 
easier to implement and enforce than a complex legislative scheme. New 
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laws would create new layers of responsibility on an already stressed 
legislative and regulatory system, which may result in a toothless, 
ineffective set of time consuming rules that fail to truly change the 
government contractor relationship. Experts are quick to point out that 
placing additional legislative rules on contractors may be ineffective, 
working only to “mar the system with red tape.”129  
When Washington State attempted to beef up its contractor 
transparency requirements by including government contractors into its 
freedom of information law (the Public Records Act), agencies had to 
scramble to set up new disclosure systems to determine what documents 
were “critical” and to properly deliver those documents. 130  Because 
agencies do not have the staff to properly administer the new layer of 
procedures assigned by the disclosure law, contractors and agencies often 
decide what is “critical” without any oversight. As a result, there is no way 
to assure that all of the important material actually ends up in agency 
control.  
In addition to preventing bureaucratic issues, contractual mandates also 
avoid the slow response time of legislatures, which often stalls statutory 
change indefinitely. Contracts work around disconnects between legislation 
and the free market world of contractors by reaching out directly to 
contractors and imposing obligations on them. Giving free market 
participants real-life, free market requirements fits in the flow of the 
contracting process.  
Changing government contract terms to increase transparency 
incentives or requirements is the best way to assure access to environmental 
information. The three possible contract clauses discussed below require 
information disclosure for government contractors, offer contractual 
incentives for environmental information disclosure, or require public 
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A. Contract Clauses Requiring Information Waivers for Government 
Contractors 
Scholars have recognized the value of contractual mechanisms 
mandating accountability in other contexts. Laura Dickinson suggests 
including accountability mechanisms into government contracts to create 
court enforceable standards of behavior.131 She writes, “it is essential that, 
at the very least, the contracts themselves incorporate public values,”132 so 
the public interest does not get lost in layers of contractor secrecy.133 
Including contractual provisions requiring contractors to provide public 
access to information on environmental issues would force contractors to 
comply with FOIA-like standards that would otherwise be unenforceable 
against the private entities.134   
Steven J. Kelman suggests that government contract clauses could 
simply be a direct application of FOIA for “FOIA-type issues” that are 
considered to be important.135 This direct inclusion of FOIA principles in 
government contracts would be an efficient solution to the opacity of 
contractors’ tasks. Alfred Aman suggests including modified FOIA request 
requirements that allow the public to make inquiries about contractors’ 
operations while the contract is in place.136  
This type of clause would most directly apply “private-FOIA” 
obligations on contractors. While FOIA transparency would be optimal for 
gaining access to contractors’ information, it may also prove quite 
burdensome for contractors. Critics of imposing FOIA requirements on 
private entities worry that “productive and innovative private organizations 
may choose not to pursue government contracts to avoid the invasion of 
privacy, the added work, and the expense required to comply.”137 They call 
the use of FOIA provisions for government contract work a “devastating 
policy that would almost certainly cause the wholesale withdrawal of firms 
not completely dependent on government business from the government 
marketplace.”138  
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While these concerns may have some merit, the information gleaned 
from private-FOIA transparency would allow those concerned with the 
Great Lakes operations in Miami’s reefs and seagrass beds to obtain records 
of work done, outlines of plans, and any information about pollution studies 
done before, during, and after the dredging project. The amount of 
information available to environmental advocates would be unparalleled by 
current contractor documentation, and, for the first time, the general public 
could actively track Great Lakes operations and have a real stake in the 
environmental outcomes of the port deepening. 
B. Contract Clauses Requiring Public Participation in Government 
Contractors’ Activities 
Another type of contractual mandate could increase public participation 
in the activities of private contractors doing government work. In normal 
agency processes, public notice and comment periods guarantee public 
participation opportunities. The same opportunity to know about and 
comment on agency activities is missing in situations where contractors 
carry out government functions. Contract clauses infusing the contracting 
process with periods where interested citizens can actively engage 
government contractors would increase transparency in government 
contracting.   
Aman urges maximizing public participation as early as possible in the 
contracting process, as contracts are often hard to terminate and sometimes 
become “immutable.” 139  The “early and often” approach to public 
participation in government contracts would be especially helpful in 
situations where environmental safety is at risk, as once something harms 
the environment it is often irreversible or very difficult to repair. Aman 
suggests that contract clauses could be made to treat the contract more like 
an agency rule than a contract negotiated between two parties, so that it 
must be placed on the agency’s website with a call for public comments, 
suggestions, alternative language, and ways to achieve its substantive goals 
from anyone wishing to comment, including affected parties.140 
Continued participation in contractor activities, not just at the outset of 
contracts, but throughout the performance of contractual terms, would 
assure that the contractors do not fall outside of initial guarantees to utilize 
environmental safeguard as the process unfolds. Continued public 
participation would help safeguard contractor practices from regulatory 
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slippage, and it would prevent agencies from falling prey to capture by 
forcing discussion and communication, which is important to democratic 
procedure.141 
In lieu of direct public participation, contracts could require contractors 
to enlist an ombudsman or designated person acting on behalf of the public. 
This system is utilized in New Zealand, where an ombudsman considers a 
particular set of rules when the government denies information disclosures 
to the public on the basis of commercial confidentiality.142 The ombudsman 
weighs the activity being protected against the market forces that may harm 
the contractor should the information be released against the public 
interest.143   
Another possibility would be creating opportunities for open discourse 
between government contractors and the beneficiaries of the contracts. On a 
state level, Wisconsin has successfully opened up its contracts with 
managed care organizations supplying Medicare and Medicaid recipients to 
community group participation. 144  This limited engagement provides 
increased transparency without the burden of a highly particularized notice 
and comment scheme. 
C. Contractor Incentives for Information Disclosure 
The federal government and state governments offer incentives for 
some of their contractors’ commitments. Contractor incentives include U.S. 
based business incentives, economic development incentives to companies 
willing to stimulate the national economy, and relocation incentives to 
business centers in a particular city or state. These practices could be used 
to urge contractors to waive information disclosure for environmentally 
relevant materials. Incentivizing contracts containing disclosure 
commitments would fit within the current contract-bidding scheme, as that 
scheme already contains incentives for other assurances. 
The federal government and state governments have utilized 
incentivized contracts to encourage environmental contractors to take extra 
steps to assure that the public interest is not forgotten in the outsourcing 
process. For instance, the EPA has employed Superfund contractors under 
cost-plus-award-fee contracts, which reimburse for costs and provide an 
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“award fee” to motivate “exceptional performance” where the contractors 
have to expend extra costs to assume extra benefits that help the public.145 
Transparency incentives could benefit the contractor as much as the 
government itself, as more transparency and public participation can 
improve the plans of private institutions.146 Using contract language to 
incentivize public participation is less burdensome on contractors than a 
private-FOIA mandate or public participation requirement, as it rewards 
good transparency behavior but does not force it. Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR) permits incentives that motivate contractor efforts that 
might not otherwise be emphasized and incentives that discourages 
contractor inefficiency and waste. 147  If contractors were financially 
rewarded for providing environmentally relevant information about their 
projects, such a reward may compel Great Lakes to release data on its 
dredging progress or proactively provide progress reports to the public. 
IV. CRITIQUES OF TRANSPARENCY CLAUSES 
Transparency clauses in government contracts would increase 
desperately needed access to environmental information. Despite the ease 
of amending contracts and the great benefit the clauses would provide to 
environmental advocacy and environmental safety, critics would point out 
some possible negative outcomes from including those clauses into 
government contracts. Some possible issues with transparency clauses 
include concerns that they may dissuade private entities from contracting, 
may controvert FOIA’s protection of private entities, and may be 
insufficient to create transparency. 
A. Increased Contract Obligations May Turn Off Contractors 
Imposing “FOIA-like” procedures on government contractors may 
increase contract prices and frighten away potential contractors who prefer 
to work without heavy bureaucracy.148 Federal agencies dedicate many 
resources to satisfying FOIA requirements, including FOIA officers, staff to 
process requests, and an infrastructure that properly stores information for 
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easy access. 149  Most federal agencies have entire offices dedicated to 
fulfilling FOIA requirements and requests.150 Hypothetically, contractors 
would have to supply a similar set of resources if they were subject to 
“FOIA-like” requirements. Whether the government would require 
contractors to supply this workforce and infrastructure themselves, or 
whether the government would create an intra-governmental system for 
contractor accountability, the undertaking would certainly require money, 
infrastructure, and manpower.   
In a cost-benefit analysis, increased public access to information about 
environmental threats trumps contractors’ concerns about potential costs of 
environmental transparency requirements. Public health is more valuable 
than money saved by not disseminating information to the public. 
Contractors acting for the government should presume that they might be 
subject to public disclosure requirements. “We can and should expect such 
public disclosure when companies step out of the purely private commercial 
world and seek to reap the financial benefits of providing essential public 
infrastructure.”151   
Dickinson suggests that allocating contract resources to oversight 
would not create financial hardship for either the government or its 
contractors.152 She explains that, because of the “huge amounts of money 
flowing to these contracts,” the government could ensure that a small 
percentage of each contractual fee gets allocated to monitoring measures 
such as increasing transparency, thus financial interests would not be 
unduly burdened.153  
B. Contractor Disclosure Conflicts with FOIA Protections 
Despite an obvious need to gain access to some types of contractor 
information (including the information that reflects potential environmental 
issues that could affect public health and welfare), FOIA itself protects a lot 
of corporate information. Thus, there is a chance that private contract 
clauses could contradict the legislative intent of FOIA. For instance, 
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FOIA’s fourth exemption protects commercial trade secrets and business 
information. 154  Although these exemptions are geared more towards 
protecting the profitability of private entities rather than withholding 
information of use to the public for health and safety reasons, there is little 
legislative history to clarify that intention, and the courts have read the 
trade secret exemption broadly. 155 Court opinions continue to expand the 
definitions of “secrecy” and “commercial use” to protect more 
information.156  
Using FOIA’s fourth exemption, federal courts permit companies to 
keep their documents hidden from the public. The D.C. Circuit Court held 
that any “commercial or financial matter” is confidential under the fourth 
exemption if disclosing the information might (1) impair the government’s 
ability to obtain necessary information in the future or (2) harm the 
competitive position of the entity from which the information was 
obtained.157 This test usually favors non-disclosure and is used despite the 
fact that it requires complicated economic analyses.158 According to the 
D.C. Circuit, if contractors voluntarily provide agencies with information 
that would “customarily not be released to the public” by a corporation, 
then the agency also cannot release it.159 
 Courts read the fourth exemption so liberally in favor of corporations 
one commenter argued that the fourth exemption essentially offers “veto 
power” to government contractors so that contractors can hide whatever 
they want from government watchdogs.160  Courts have interpreted the 
fourth exemption in favor of corporate secrecy over the public interest and 
Congress has not stepped in to curb this trend.161 Thus, FOIA’s fourth 
exemption has become a “shelter,” protecting the private industry’s 
damaging or embarrassing information from public disclosure.162  
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Along with procurement policies that explain to contractors how their 
confidential business information (CBI) will be protected, several statutes 
dealing with environmental information also clarify whether certain 
information is CBI.163 The Clean Air Act (CAA) specifies that emission 
data is not CBI.164 However, it is not clear whether the data that goes into 
emissions calculations (raw material used, production volume, etc.) are 
CBI, so while contractors must disclose emissions data, they may not be 
obligated to offer any more than that.165 
The amount of CBI privacy granted to contractors has spurred clashes 
between environmental advocates trying to get information and the federal 
government. When the Environmental Integrity Project sought data on coal 
ash disposal practices from power plants, some of the plants claimed their 
data was “confidential business information” (CBI) and did not turn over 
the information.166 In 2006, environmentalists had to turn to the courts to 
attempt to get data on existing bromide stockpiles that the EPA refused to 
open to the public under the shield of CBI.167 In addition, in 2005, a court 
upheld the public’s right to obtain documents regarding genetically 
modified crops after the EPA refused to disseminate them using the CBI 
exemption.168 In San Jose, California, citizens seeking information about 
the government’s proposed purchase of industrial land in the South Bay 
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were rebuffed by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife department, which claimed that 
the information was CBI belonging to Cargill.169 
In 2007, Congresswoman Barbara Boxer criticized the EPA for hiding 
documents regarding CERCLA cleanup fund shortages as “privileged” 
under CBI even though they actually did not contain CBI information.170 
She said they should be available to the public automatically. 171 
Environmentalists wanted the information in order to assess the agency’s 
ability to meet cleanup goals.172 Disclosure clauses in contracts may resolve 
these types of battles, but the piles of court precedent stacked in favor of 
corporate privacy in the face of disclosure requirements may be tough to 
override if government contractors choose to fight the contractual 
obligations. 
Some sources of hope for the success of contractual transparency 
requirements are the statutes that explicitly require transparency in 
environmentally sensitive situations. Some environmental legislation 
requires certain public disclosures, making it clear that in situations where 
public health and safety are at risk, the public’s right to know overrides 
corporate secrecy. 
For example, the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know 
Act (EPCRA), a law created in 1986 to prepare communities for 
emergencies, requires public notifications when potential chemical hazards 
exist.173 Under EPCRA, owners and operators of some types of facilities 
must publish material safety data sheets and chemical inventories that 
exceed Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) thresholds.  
Furthermore, the CAA provides for “community oversight and public 
dissemination of information on the consequences of potential accidental 
releases of dangerous compounds from private and public chemical 
facilities.”174 The Act requires stationary chemical emission sources to give 
Risk Management Plans (RMP) to the EPA and the public, as well as a 
five-year release history, emergency prevention and response plans, and an 
“Off-Site-Consequence Analysis” summarizing the worst-case scenario for 
a facility.175 These RMPs are technically publicly available, however, they 
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can only be viewed (no copying allowed) in on-site reading rooms.176 Sean 
Moulton, an analyst with OMBWatch, a government watchdog 
organization, says that RMPs are light on details and cannot be relied upon 
as a sole source of environmental information.177 
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires federal 
agencies to draft Environmental Impact Statements (EISs) and release them 
to the public before engaging in activities that significantly affect the 
quality of the human environment.178 EISs are open to public review, and 
the agency must include any comments and responses in the final draft of 
the EIS.179  
The disclosure provisions found in EPCRA, CAA, and NEPA 
demonstrate that the government does not intend to shield environmental 
information from public view. These statutory disclosure requirements 
share the same purpose as environmental information transparency clauses 
in government contracts: to inform the public about environmental issues 
that may affect their safety. Because of this shared purpose, it is unlikely 
that courts would apply traditional FOIA exemptions to contractors 
unwilling to provide environmentally relevant information. 
C. Public Participation Burden the System for Little Gain 
Although increased public participation would theoretically increase 
environmental transparency, adding additional processes to government 
contracting threatens to bog down an efficient contracting system with 
layers of process. Public participation may also delay projects if there are 
debates between the public and the contracted entity. Such debate is useful 
in a legislative forum, and in fact, is an integral part of our federal system’s 
checks and balances. However, it could be argued that the administrative 
system must move more fluidly and with less external intervention so that 
contracts get fulfilled and projects do not stall, holding contractors in 
perpetual discourse with no resolution.   
Additionally, public participation has not always proven to be the most 
effective way to guarantee transparency. For example, when the World 
Bank financed private contractors to build an oil pipeline in Chad, they 
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included provisions requiring local public participation throughout the 
contract’s performance.180 As a result of the public participation clauses, 
Exxon, the leading oil company on the project, “engaged in extensive 
consultations with local groups” and sent experts and consultants, including 
sociologists and ethnologists, to the region affected by the project.181 In the 
end, the huge amount of public participation did not alleviate the concerns 
of non-governmental environmental organizations that, to this day, 
condemn the negative environmental impacts of the pipeline project.182 
Although there are many reasons for this, including political differences 
and the intricacies of international law, the example raises the possibility 
that public participation may be a lot of talk with far less action. 
In the Miami port scenario, direct and open conversations among Great 
Lakes, the local and federal government entities, and members of the public 
would increase awareness and allow for debate. Whether public 
participation would actually change operations or sway the will of the 
contractor is unknown, at least the public would have a glimpse into a 
major project affecting their local environment. Even if a public 
participation clause does not have the full force of a “private-FOIA” 
requirement, it is a less burdensome approach and would bridge an 
important information gap. Cooperation between contractors and the public 
provides public deliberation, which forces determinations that are less 
partial and are more aligned with the public’s interests. Public participation 
provides corporate activities with an audience, which “keeps the 
corporations honest” by making sure contractors satisfy the public’s 
judgment on the merits of their goods and services.183  
D. Contracts May Not Be Enough 
Critics of enhancing public policies through private contracts are quick 
to point out that a contract is not an infallible document. Adequately 
specifying contractual terms in order to meet the needs of the public can be 
a daunting task.184 Agencies drafting contracts often struggle with “defining 
requirements, establishing expected outcomes, and assessing contractor 
performance.”185 Even if the perfect contractual language properly holds 
government contractors to higher transparency standards, there is a proven 
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lack of supervision over federal government contractors that increases the 
chances of poor contract performance. 186  The failures of government 
oversight could undermine the contractual FOIA language, making the 
inclusion of environmental transparency clauses nothing more than 
inserting toothless suggestions instead of well-enforced terms of agreement. 
In addition to the inability of contracts to bind parties to best practices, 
incentives placed in contracts are not guaranteed to work. Gregory Garrett, 
an acquisitions expert specializing in federal government contracts, reports 
that contract incentives have had mixed results: “Sometimes they have 
worked very successfully and other times they have failed to motivate the 
contractor to achieve excellent results.”187 Even with an incentive, there is 
no guarantee that the contractor will provide any additional information. 
Thus, this is the weakest transparency provision of the three contract 
clauses. Despite the offer of an incentive, Great Lakes, like other 
contractors, could choose to eschew the reward in favor of keeping its 
business affairs away from public view.  
With the infallibility of contract clauses in mind, it is important to 
remember that in the current contracting scheme there are hardly any 
requirements that government contractors keep the public informed about 
any aspect of their operations. This is true even if they are engaged in 
activities that could greatly harm the public environment. Companies can 
easily bypass statutory transparency obligations by hiding behind trade 
secrets and business information protections. Corporations must be made 
accountable for keeping the public informed when they do things that affect 
the environment. Contract clauses are an efficient, fast, and comfortable 
mechanism through which the government can engage its contractors and 
compel them to be environmentally transparent. While contracts are rarely 
perfect, they do offer an opportunity to create enforceable transparency 
assurances and access to otherwise private information held by government 
contractors.  
CONCLUSION 
In 2007, David S. Levine said that contractor secrecy and “its attendant 
goals of pecuniary gain and commercial competition” conflicts with the 
goals of transparent and accountable democratic governance.188 He warned 
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that if we do not improve contractor transparency, then contractor-created 
infrastructure will direct public law instead of the democratic legislative 
and regulatory processes designed to safeguard the public interest.189 
To shed sunlight on agency activities FOIA fails to reach, the United 
States must create transparency obligations for private contractors working 
on environmental projects. Government contracting does not protect public 
health and environmental interests as outsourcing does not account for 
market failures, reign in regulatory slippage, or prevent agency capture. 
Public citizens are not mere “clients” in the government contracting 
process, and private entities should not be able to sidestep democratic 
safeguards carefully embedded in the federal government’s practices.190 In 
the environmental context, where individual citizens cannot control the 
environmental effects of government projects, it is important that people 
have access to information vital to protecting public health. This is 
especially true in situations where private entities engage in cost-cutting, 
efficiency-maximizing behaviors that do not honor environmental 
protection and endanger land, air, and water.191  
Thus, government contractors should comply with the same democratic 
norms as the government agencies that hire them.192  Compliance with 
democratic, FOIA-like transparency measures should be written into 
contracts between federal agencies and third-party contractors. Clauses 
requiring information waivers for environmental activities and data, clauses 
requiring public participation and regular reporting for contractor activities, 
and contractual incentives for disclosure would force public openness and 
information accessibility for projects carried out by government 
contractors. In projects that involve the health and safety of millions of 
United States citizens, like the dredging project off Miami’s coast, 
contractors should be obligated to provide information and satisfy the 
public’s “right-to-know.” 
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